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Note

THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE TORT CLAIMS ACT:
END OF AN ENLIGHTENED ERA?
T

N 1946, AFTER YEARS OF UNSUCCESSFUL A1TTEMPTS to grant citizens the right to
.hold the federal government liable for its torts, Congress passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).1 It was by far the broadest waiver of
sovereign immunity ever granted by Congress. Prior, more limited waivers of
immunity had been granted through the enactment of the Tucker Act,2 the
Suits in Admiralty Act 3 and the Public Vessels Act. 4 The Act proclaimed that
the United States would be liable for

claims against the United States for money damages, accruing on
and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
5
occurred.
The congressional waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States
was not absolute, however. Congress excluded from judicial review twelve
types of government actions, which it deemed necessary for the unimpeded
operation of governmental activities. 6 By far the most significant one, and the
one resulting in the most litigation, has been the "discretionary function
exception", which protects the United States from liability for the acts or
omissions of government employees, taken pursuant to a statute or regulation,
involving the performance or failure of performance of a discretionary
function or duty, regardless of whether or not the discretion involved was
abused.'
The fact that Congress did not completely waive immunity from suit has
resulted in a problem in determining the proper scope of statutory
interpretation; that is, should the FTCA be strictly construed as a limited
waiver of immunity or more broadly interpreted as a blanket consent to suit
with certain statutory exceptions? 8 Since the legislative history was generally
Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-22, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402,
1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-78, 2680 (1976)). For a review of the legislative history of
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), see Gottlieb, The FederalTort ClaimsAct - A Statutory
Interpretation,35 GEO. L. J. 1, 2-9 (1946).
2 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3 Act of March 9, 1920, Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
4 Act of March 3, 1925, Ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1970)).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1976).
The exceptions, currently thirteen, are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(1976).
Reynolds, Strict Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Does "Wrongful" Cover a
Few Sins, No Sins, or Non-Sins?, 23 AM. U. L. REv. 813, 819 (1974).
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inconclusive as to the congressional intent on this point, 9 the Supreme Court
struggled with this question throughout the early history of the FTCA. The
Court eventually adopted a statutory construction that clearly favored the
view that the FTCA should be interpreted as a broad waiver of immunity,
with a correspondingly narrow view of the application of its statutory
10
exceptions.
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in the use of this broad
construction however. Recent decisions of the Court interpreting the FTCA,
including Laird v. Nelms" and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States,'2 and to a lesser extent, Logue v. United States13 and United States v.
Orleans, 4 indicate a definite shift away from the Supreme Court's broad view
of the Act, towards a much narrower concept of governmental tort liability. It
is the purpose of this note to document and analyze this rather drastic shift in
construction of the FTCA, in light of the past precedents, legislative history
and public policy.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF THE

DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Before examining the Supreme Court's various interpretations of the
FTCA, it is appropriate to closely consider the desirability of, and
justifications for, construing the statute strictly or broadly. The dichotomy is
represented in the following contrasting statements: "the rule of liberal
construction is to be applied to exceptions contained in the Federal Tort
Claims Act so as not to impose liability upon the Federal Government in
instances where it is apparent that Congress saved or reserved governmental
immunity,"' 5 (a statement of the narrow view) and "where a statute contains a
clear and sweeping waiver of immunity from suit on all claims with certain
well-defined exceptions, resort to that rule [of strict construction] cannot be
had in order to enlarge the exceptions" 16 (illustrative of the broader
interpretation).
Consideration of the various interpretations of the FTCA necessarily
involves an examination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although an
in-depth discussion of the concept is beyond the scope of this note, a brief
evaluation is necessary since, generally speaking, a broad interpretation of the
FTCA will deny application of the doctrine while a strict interpretation will
maintain it.
Sovereign immunity is rooted in the English common-law idea that the
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 29-30 (1953); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,138

(1950).
10 See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-97, infra.

11406 U.S. 797 (1972).
12 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
13412 U.S. 521 (1973).
14 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
15 Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792, 796 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
11Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1948), quoted in
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 548-49 n.5 (1951).
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"King can do no wrong."1 7 The doctrine has been judicially recognized in the
United States since 1821.18 However, throughout the 20th century, the theory
of governmental immunity has been highly criticized by many legal
scholars. 9 It has been declared unnecessary, since the governments of other
countries that do not recognize sovereign immunity manage to function
effectively. 20 It is asserted that sovereign immunity results in the inefficient
administration of injury claims, in the sense that it prevents courts from
resolving controversies for which they are especially well suited.2 Looking at
it from another point of view, sovereign immunity is said to violate the
modern concept that entities engaging in enterprises that can cause injury to
innocent victims ought to bear the cost of the damage of those activities.2 2 And
from an economic point of view, organizations and governments that cause
these injuries are asserted to be much better able to distribute the cost and
bear the risk than those who actually suffer injury.2 3
The most serious criticism of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is simply
that it is unjust, because it forces an individual who is injured by the
negligence of a government employee to absorb the cost of that injury
without compensation from the government. As one commentator has put it,
"[i]t ought to be fundamental in a democracy that an individual who is injured
should not be deprived of redress merely because he was injured by
24
governmental activity."
On the other hand, few commentators would advocate the complete
abolition of sovereign immunity. It is generally agreed that there is a line
beyond which the waiver of immunity should not extend, beyond which
governmental operations would be impaired 2 5 As Dean Pound has stated,
[i]t is a crucial problem in the interpretation and application of the
Federal Tort Claims Act to give adequate relief to the victims of
injury inflicted upon them by agencies and operations under the
control of the federal government and yet avoid impairment of the
26
full efficacy of that control for its public and social purposes.
Two general justifications are usually put forth in support of at least a
limited form of sovereign immunity. The first, as has been suggested, is that
subjecting governments to private litigation would seriously impair the
17 3

K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01 (1958).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
19 See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.00 (Supp. 1976); STREET, GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY (1953); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1,129,229 (19241925); Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort (pts. 4-6), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (19261927).
20 Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in France,29 N.Y.U.L.R. 1432 (1954).
2' Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 757, 803 (1926).
22 Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 30 NACCA L.J. 404, 418 (1963).
23 Note,

Utility, Fairnessand the Takings Clause: Three Perspectives on Laird v. Nelms, 59

VA. L. REV. 1034, 1055 (1973).
24 Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In

a Democracy The EmperorHas No Clothes, 1966 U. ILL.

L.F. 828, 847.
25 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 29.3 (1956).
26 Pound, supra note 22, at 416.
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efficient function of governmental bodies and cause a loss of control by the
executive bodies of their statutory responsibilities.2 7 The theory is that
government officials should be protected from judicial scrutiny in those areas
where they must be free to make policy and experiment; the possibility of
governmental liability resulting from official action would tend to inhibit the
freedom and independence of government officials and reduce their
efficiency. 28 A corollary of this point is that the judiciary is necessarily illequipped to scrutinize and pass judgment on policy decisions and thus
sovereign immunity furthers the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.

29

To the extent this view is valid, the existence of the "discretionary function
exception" to the FTCA would seem adequate to protect the interests of the
United States.3 0 Although the legislative purpose in enacting the discretionary
function exception is somewhat uncertain, 3 1 the federal courts have adopted a
construction of the Act that distinguishes between governmental activity in a
policy-formulation setting which is protected and that which is merely an
execution of that policy, which is not.3 2 The discretionary function exception
would seem to be adequate protection for the United States against judicial
interference in the performance of legislative and administrative activities,
and any interpretation of the FTCA tending to expand this protection is
unnecessary.
The second justification advanced in defense of sovereign immunity is that
to allow recovery against the government would threaten a raid on the federal
treasury, endanger important policies and goals, and ultimately affect the
stability of the government.3 3 The response to this has been that the absence of
immunity has not bankrupted the treasuries of those countries which have
allowed for almost unlimited recovery.3 4 In addition, the existence of a
legislative mechanism for compensation through the device of private
petitions to Congress for relief 15 results in the federal government spending
large amounts to vindicate many claims not covered under the FTCA.386 To

L.

11 Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,59 HARV.
1060, 1061 (1946). See also, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce, 337 U.S. 682

REV.

(1949).
28 Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the FederalTort Claims Act, 57 GEO.
L.J. 81, 121 (1968).
29 Id. at 121-22.
30 Some commentators believe that even the discretionary function is unnecessary to protect
the interests of the United States. For articles calling for the abolishment or modification of the
discretionary function exception, see Mikva, supra note 24, at 838; Peck, The FederalTort Claims
Act - A Proposed Constructionof the DiscretionaryFunctionException,31 WASH. L. REV. 207
(1956); 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 25, at § 29.15.
31 Reynolds, supra note 28, at 83-84.
32 See generally, Reynolds, supra,note 28; Comment, FederalTort ClaimsAct: Discretionary
Function Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976).
" Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1457.
34

Id.

35 Congress' power to enact private legislation affording compensation for claimants stems

from Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, the congressional power to pay the debts of the
United States. See Gellhorn and Lauer, FederalLiability for Personaland PropertyDamage, 29
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (1954).
36 The best example of this is the congressional action taken to compensate the thousands of
claimants injured in the Texas-City disaster, who were denied relief by the United States
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the extent that the government pays for its torts anyway, the argument that
sovereign immunity is necessary for the fiscal security of the nation loses
37
considerable force.
This brief summary highlights the injustice of denying recovery against
the United States for its torts. In light of the fact that sovereign immunity is
largely unnecessary and unfair, and the fact that any need for it is met in the
tort area by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, it is clear that
when a legislative body acts to waive its sovereign immunity, judicial
attempts to resurrect the doctrine through a strict construction of the waiver,
and an expansive view of the exceptions are unwarranted.
In considering the interpretation of a statute, the courts, of course, should
not overlook the purposes of the legislative body in passing the legislation. It is
generally agreed that two considerations prompted Congress to pass the
FTCA. The first was a desire by Congress to mitigate the unjust consequences
of sovereign immunity and extend a judicial remedy to those who previously
had none. 38 Congress was well aware of the injustice suffered by those who
were unfortunate enough to incur injury at the hands of negligent federal
employees, and were forced to bear the burden and cost of such injuries
themselves.
Equally as important in the passage of the Act was the desire of Congress
to rid itself of the time-consuming, inefficient and often inequitable process of
reviewing private bills for relief.39 Such bills were the only recourse for those
injured by the tortious acts of the government, and by the 1940's Congress was
receiving over a thousand petitions for relief each year. 40 Passage of the Act
was a recognition of the fact that the judiciary was in a much better position to
dispose of those claims than was a legislative body.4
These considerations of Congress in passing the Act are persuasive
support for a judicial adoption of an expansive view of the FTCA, since any
interpretation which denies recovery necessarily frustrates the congressional
purposes underpinning the FTCA. Of course, standing alone they would
require liability against the United States in all cases; obviously such a
suggestion is not made. Rather, the purposes must be weighed in the balance
in each case, with their full weight directed against narrow judicial
interpretations of the FTCA. In light of the statutory purposes, rules of
construction,4 2 the overwhelming equities on behalf of the claimants, and the
Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See discussion in text
accompanying notes 55-63 supra. Congress allowed recovery, with a maximum limit of $25,000
per claimant. See Texas City Disaster - Settlement of Claims. Pun. L. No. 378, 69 Stat. 707
k1955). See generally Gellhom and Lauer, CongressionalSettlement of Tort ClaimsAgainst the
United States, 55 COL. L. REV. 1 (1955).
a Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1458.
8 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950); Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1956).
39 See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543,549-50 (1951). See also, Hearingson H.R.
5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 29-30
(1942). See generally, Gottlieb, supra note 1 at 2-9.
40 H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1945).
41 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953).
42 Another consideration in favor of a broad view of the FTCA and a narrow view of the
statutory exceptions is the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
which would result in a presumption that those activities not included in the statutory exceptions
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protection of necessary legislative and administrative operations and
functions through the discretionary function exception, a broad construction
of the FTCA which favors limiting the express statutory exceptions to their
language, is well-founded.
II.

EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE

FTCA

The Supreme Court's initial interpretations of the FTCA gave some
indication that the Court would liberally construe the coverage of the Act, but
the cases were not consistent. The Court first interpreted the substantive
provisions of the FTCA in the case of Brooks v. United States.43 Brooks
involved a suit against the army for damages as a result of the alleged
negligence of a civilian employee of the Army in driving an Army truck that
had collided with the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff, Brooks, was himself a
serviceman, on furlough, not on military business. The Court granted
recovery against the government, holding that the FTCA allowed servicemen
who received injuries "not incident to their service" to obtain damages. In
Brooks, the Court utilized a three-step analysis in determining whether the
particular claim came within the waiver of sovereign immunity. This analysis
consisted of the following inquiry: (1) whether the claim was within the clear
language of the waiver; (2) whether the claim was barred by any of the
statutory exceptions; (3) whether there was external evidence that Congress
did not intend to bring the particular claim within the reach of the FTCA.
The Court noted that "[t]he statute's terms are clear. They provide for
District Court jurisdiction over any claim founded on negligence brought
against the United States. We are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any
claim but that of servicemen.' "41 The Court went on to note that none of the
exceptions barred the claim, and that Congress could not be seen to have
intended to exclude the claims of servicemen. 45 Nevertheless, the majority
reserved opinion on the situation of a plaintiff serviceman injured in the course
of his duties.
That issue came to the Court one year later in Feresv. United States.46 In
Feres, the executrix of a serviceman killed in a barracks fire attempted to
recover damages from the United States on the theory that the military had
negligently quartered him in a dangerous facility. 47 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Jackson held that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply to
are necessarily excluded from those exceptions and are thus covered within the provisions of the
FTCA. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 53.
43 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
44 Id. at 51.
4- Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the vast majority of tort claims bills
introduced into Congress between 1925 and 1935 contained exceptions denying recovery to
servicemen, but the FTCA in its final form did not include such exceptions. Id. at 51-52.
Another issue that the Court considered in interpreting congressional intent was whether an
FTCA remedy was consistent with other existing statutory schemes of compensation. Cognizant
of the fact that Brooks was receiving veteran's benefits, the Court refused to find that those
benefits were his exclusive remedy, stating that "[w]e will not call either remedy in the present
case exclusive, nor pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not done
so." Id. at 53. However, the Court did remand the case to the lower court to inquire whether
damages should be reduced by the amount of disability benefits already paid.
46340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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servicemen who sustained injuries incident to the performance of their
military duties, despite the fact that their injuries may have been negligently
inflicted. Noting that there was little relevant legislative history, the Court
construed the Act "to fit, so far as will comport with its words, into the entire
statutory system of remedies against the Government to make a workable,
consistent and equitable whole."4" In so doing, the Court implied an exception
to the FTCA, by concluding that Congress could not have intended to allow
recovery in this type of situation. Factors the Court considered with respect to
that determination included (1) the conclusion that the government was only
liable to the extent of a private individual, and since no private individual had
the power to conscript, there was no possibility of private liability and thus no
governmental liability; (2) that since the relationship of a government to its
servicemen was "distinctively federal" in character, the requirement of the
Act that state law determine tort liability must be inapplicable; and (3) that the
existence of a "simple, certain and uniform" system of compensation49 for the
injuries suffered by servicemen would make recovery of damages under the
50
FTCA duplicative and costly to the government.
Fereswas a retreat from the interpretation used in Brooks in the sense that
the Feres Court found, unlike the Brooks Court, that Congress intended to
exclude additional claimants under the FTCA - servicemen in the line of
duty - beyond those specifically excluded from coverage. In addition, by
finding that the FTCA could not be meant to apply because of the
distinctively federal character of the relationship between the military and its
servicemen, the Court read narrowly the requirement that the United States
was liable according to state law, to the extent that a private party would have
been liable under similar circumstances. These rationales were not destined to
remain.
A year after Feres, in a non-military context, the Court decided the case of
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 51 which presented the procedural issue of
whether the United States would be liable for indemnity or contribution. In
determining that the United States could be liable for contribution, the Court
gave notice that it embraced a broad conception of the Act. In an oft-cited
statement, the Court asserted that "[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act waives the
Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language." 52 The Court also
stated:"where a statute contains a clear and sweeping waiver of immunity
from suit on all claims with certain well-defined exceptions, resort to that rule
53
[of strict construction] cannot be had in order to enlarge the exceptions."
The Court again utilized the three-step analysis employed in Brooks,
47Decided together with Feres were Jefferson v. United States and United States v. Griggs,
both of which involved claims of medical malpractice.
s340 U.S. at 139.
4 The Court was referring to the various statutes passed by Congress designed to compensate
members of the military for injuries received while in service. For a list of these statutes, see 340
U.S. at 144 n.12.
5 340 U.S. at 140-44. See Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINcS L. J. 1281, 1284 (1973).
51340 U.S. 543 (1951).
-2340 U.S. at 547.
5 340 U.S. at 548-49 n.5 (quoting Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655,657
(9th Cir., 1948)).
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noting that the claim for contribution was covered by the Act and not
included within the exceptions to the Act, and rejecting a reading of the
legislative history that would exclude such claims. The Court noted the
general trend toward a liberal construction of the consent to suit and felt that it
' 54
would be "inconsistent to whittle it down by refinements. "
The Yellow Cab case supported the position that the sovereign's waiver of
immunity was to be strictly construed against the sovereign. Two years later,
however, the Court decided the famous case of Dalehite v. United States.55
Dalehite was one of over 300 actions brought against the United States under
the FTCA for deaths resulting from an explosion at Texas City, Texas, of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer produced under the control of the United States
for export purposes. The district court found that the explosion was due to the
negligence of the government in adopting and planning the program, in
failing to warn of the dangerous nature of the product and in failing to police
the loading of the material on shipboard. The judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.56 The Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals in a 4-3 decision authored by Justice Reed. 7 The majority
held that all the activities alleged to have been negligently performed were
within the discretionary function of the FTCA. As the Court stated:
It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discretionary function or
duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also
includes determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where
58
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.
After an extensive analysis of the facts, the majority concluded that all the
actions in question resulted from planning-level decisions and were therefore
59
protected.
In discussing the issue of the alleged negligence of the Coast Guard in
fighting the fire caused by the explosion, the Court, relying on Feres,
concluded that since there was no analogous private liability of fire-fighters in
general tort law, there could be no liability on the part of the United States
pursuant to the Act, which provided that the United States was liable if a
"private person" would also have been liable under similar circumstances. 60
The Dalehite majority also considered the possibility of the United States
being held strictly liable for the Texas City injuries, and concluded that it
54340 U.S. at 550.

5 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
56 In re Texas City Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
5' Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Clark took part in the consideration or decision of the
case. 346 U.S. at 45.
58 id. at 35-36.
59 Id. at 42. In regard to the discretionary function analysis in Dalehite, see generally
Matthews, FTCA - The ProperScope of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 6 Am.U.L. REV.
22 (1957); Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the FederalTort Claims Act, 57
GEO.L.J. 81,93-98 (1968-1969); Comment, Inadequaciesof FederalSovereign Immunity: A New
Perspective, 61 GEO.L.J. 1535 (1973).
60 346 U.S. at 43-44.
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could not. This conclusion was based upon an interpretation of the legislative
history which the Court felt indicated that the words "negligent and wrongful
act or omission" of the Act were meant to require a showing of fault.6 1
A strong dissent by Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Frankfurter and
Black, pointed out that the catastrophe resulted not from a policy decision at
all but rather from negligent loading, handling and supervision, which were
analogous to acts of a private manufacturer or shipper. The minority was
concerned that the result of the majority decision was not to uproot the
doctrine that "the King can do no wrong" as Congress had intended, but rather
that the doctrine had "only been amended to read, the King can do only little
wrongs."'62
A flood of commentary followed the Dalehitedecision, with most authors
taking critical views.6 3 Although Dalehite did not involve, as did the prior
decisions before the Court, the question of who could recover under the Tort
Claims Act, but rather for what action a successful claim would lie, the
decision was hardly consistent with the Court's view in Yellow Cab of the
FTCA as a sweeping waiver of immunity. At this point, predicting the future
path of statutory interpretations of the Tort Claims Act was ill-advised; the
Court was clearly struggling for an acceptable basis for construction.
III.

BEYOND

Feres AND Dalehite

64

In United States v. Brown, the Court turned to a consideration of the
scope of the Feres doctrine. In Brown, the Court held in a 6-3 decision that a
discharged veteran could recover under the Tort Claims Act for an injury that
occurred during hospitalization after discharge because the veteran was not
"on active duty or subject to military discipline" and had "enjoyed a civilian
status" when the injury occurred.6 5 The Court refused to apply Feres and
allowed recovery even though the plaintiff had already received compensation for his injury pursuant to the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of
1935.66 The Court appeared inclined to limit Feres to its facts as it explained
Feres as involving:
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the

61 Id. at 45. For criticisms of this view, see Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the FederalTort
Claims Act, 24 FED B.J. 139 (1964); Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9
STAN. L. REV. 433 (1957). But see Seavey, "Liberal Construction"and the Tort Liability of the

FederalGovernment, 67 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1954).
2 346 U.S. at 60.
63 See, e.g., Peck, supra note 30; 35 NEB. L. REV. 509 (1956); 32 TEX. L. REV. 474 (1954); 12 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 247 (1957).
64 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
65 Id. at 112.
66 Ch. 102, § 31,48 Stat. 509,523 (1934). Thus the "simple and uniform compensation system"
that was a major factor in persuading the Court to find the FTCA inapplicable in Feres, carried
little weight with the Brown court, although the Court adhered to the Brooks set-off principle for
prior payments. 348 U.S. at 113. See, Jacoby, supra note 50, at 1286. But see, United States v.
Demko, 285 U.S. 149 (1966).
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extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act
were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed
in the course of military duty . . . .7
In both its express pronouncements68 and its limited interpretation of Feres,
the Court indicated that it was giving a broader interpretation to the Tort
Claims Act, and was not inclined to imply an additional exception to the Act
for veterans injured after discharge.
The Court further restricted Feres, and Dalehite as well, a year later in
Indian Towing Co. v. United States.69 The issue there was whether the United
States was liable for the Coast Guard's negligent maintenance of a lighthouse,
which had resulted in a tugboat and barge running aground. The majority
rejected the government's argument, successful in Feres and Dalehite, that
liability could not lie against the United States because the operation of a
lighthouse was a governmental activity that had no private counterpart. The
Court felt that this distinction between governmental activities - those
activities performed by the federal government without private counterparts
- and proprietary activities, was not warranted by the legislative history of
the FTCA and was contrary to the underlying philosophy of the FTCA to
restrict governmental immunity. To accept this distinction would have
excluded most government activity from the reach of the Tort Claims Act,
since that is by definition "uniquely governmental," and would have plunged
the federal courts into the "non-governmental-governmental quagmire"
faced by the state courts. 7° This holding that the government may be liable for
negligence in carrying out a function even if that function had no private
7
analogue was a direct repudiation of the views stated in Feresand Dalehite. 1
The retreat from the narrow view of the FTCA taken by the Feres and
72
DalehiteCourts was continued two years later in Rayonier v. United States.
Rayonier involved the liability of the United States under the Tort Claims Act
for the negligence of Forest Service employees in fighting a forest fire. The
Rayonier Court made it clear that Indian Towing had rejected the theory that
the United States was only liable when it acts in a "proprietary" as opposed to
a "governmental" capacity. Justice Black's majority opinion construed the
FTCA very broadly, indicating the Court's view that the purpose of the
73
FTCA was "to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability."
The Court interpreted congressional intent as seeking to relieve the economic
burden of injury suffered by citizens by transferring it to the government, thus
spreading the costs of such injuries among those who directly or indirectly
67

348 U.S. at 112.

" The Court noted the "broadpattern of liability which the United States undertook by the
Tort Claims Act." Id. (emphasis added).
69350 U.S. 61 (1955).
70 Id. at 65.
7'This result was emphasized in the minority opinion written by Justice Reed. The minority
indicated that a narrow interpretation was warranted and consistent with Feresand Dalehite."It
is certainly not necessary that every word in a statute receive the broadest possible interpretation.
If Congress intended to create liability for all incidents not theretofore actionable against suable
public agencies, that intention should be made plain." 350 U.S. at 75 (Reed, J., dissenting).
72 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
13

Id. at 319.
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benefitted from the activities.74 Evidence of the Court's broad view of the
beneficial purpose of the FTCA is found in the statement by the majority that
"there is no justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond
those provided by Congress."' 75 In a footnote 76 that was to cause great

confusion as to whether or not the Court still embraced the Dalehite view
rejecting strict liability against the United States, the Court cited, apparently
with favor, a Fourth Circuit opinion that had, in essence, allowed strict
liability, United States v. Praylou'7

Thus, in three cases in succession, Brown, Indian Towing and Rayonier,
the Supreme Court substantially changed the manner in which it construed
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 78 This line of cases led many commentators to

believe that the precedential value of Feres and Dalehite had been severely
7
limited.

1

The Supreme Court did not again rule on any significant cases involving
the Tort Claims Act until 1963, when it decided the case of United States v.
Muniz. 0 Muniz involved the question of whether or not prisoners in federal
institutions were entitled to maintain actions against the United States for
71Id. at
75Id. at
76 Id.

319-20.
320.

at 319 n.2.

77208 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954), noted in 23 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 106 (1954). In Praylou, the Fourth Circuit applied South Carolina's strict liability statute

(S.C. Code § 2-6 (1952)), to arrive at liability against the United States for damage caused by a
plane crash. The court distinguished Dalehite as applying only to possession of dangerous
property, not damage actually inflicted by federal employees. The court reasoned that:
It would be absolutely absurd to hold that the government is liable under the Tort
Claims Act for the act of an employee who crashes into a house with a truck but not
liable if he crashes into it with an airplane, and this on the theory that there is absolute
liability under state law in the latter case but not in the former. The man on the street
would never understand any such distinction; and in the minds of thoughtful lawyers, it
would do little credit to the law.
208 F.2d at 295. The court was unperturbed by the argument that Congress did not intend for the
United States to be liable in the absence of fault, because the effect of South Carolina law "was to
make the infliction of injury or damage by the operation of an aeroplane a wrongful act in itself."
208 F.2d at 295.
Praylou was contrary to all other lower court decisions deciding the strict liability issue after
Dalehite. See cases cited in Note, Government Immunity From Strict Liability for Damages
Caused by Sonic Boom, 47 TUL. L. REV. 920,922 n.19 (1973). For a conclusion that the "cryptic"
citation of Praylou indicated that the Court in the future would limit the rationale of Dalehite in
this regard, see Peck, supra note 61, at 935, and see generallyJacoby, Absolute Liability Underthe
Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. B.J. 139 (1964); Comment, FederalLiability for Sonic Boom
Damage, 31 S.CAL. L. REV. 259 (1958).
7 This was due partly to a change in the composition of the bench and partly to a reversal of
position, in favor of a broader concept of the Act, on the part of several of the justices. Only two
members from the original unanimous Feres court took the same view in Rayonier - Justices
Reed and Clark - who dissented. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan and Brennan had replaced Chief Justice Vinton and Justices Jackson and Minton, all of whom had voted with the
majority in Feres;Vinton and Minton had further voted with the majority in Dalehite.In addition
Justices Douglas, Black and Burton all voted for a broader concept of the Act in Rayonier than
they had in Feres. See Caruso, An Analysis of the Evolution of the Supreme Court's Concept of
the FederalTort Claims Act, 26 FED. B.J. 35 (1966); Peck, supra note 61, at 436 n.18.
79See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 25.09-11 (1958); Gerwig, A Decade of
Litigation Under the FederalTort ClaimsAct, 24 TENN. L. REV. 301 (1957); Caruso, supranote 78;
Pound supra note 22.
80374 U.S. 150 (1963), noted in 35 Miss. L.J. 317 (1963), 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 177 (1963); 15 SYR.
L. REV. 124 (1963); 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 163 (1963).
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injuries caused by the negligence of federal employees. 81 The Supreme Court,
building upon the immediate past precedents, unanimously allowed
recovery. Chief Justice Warren utilized the three-part test of examining the
Act to determine whether it embraced the activity, determining whether the
activity came within a statutory exception and examining the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended to include such claims under
the FTCA. The Court concluded that Congress had indeed intended to
permit such suits by federal prisoners.8 2 Noting that Feres had been relied
upon by the lower courts in denying prisoners' claims, the Court pointed out
that parts of the Feres holding had been limited by Indian Towing and
Rayonier, in that the FTCA "extends to novel and unprecedented liability.""
Relying on Brown, the Court also stated, in dicta, that the presence of a
compensation system of the type that had been persuasive in Feres did not bar
a negligence suit.8 4 As in Brown, the Court in Muniz was inclined to limit the
Feres decision to the facts peculiar to servicemen.8 5
The Court's expansive language in referring to the purposes and effects of
the FTCA was consistent with the precedents of Yellow Cab, Brown, Indian
Towing and Rayonier. The decision spoke of the "general waiver of
immunity" undertaken by the FTCA, s8 and noted that it provided much7
needed relief to those injured by the negligence of government employees.
The Court also reiterated the view expressed in Rayonier that there was no
justification, in light of the purposes and effects of the Act to read exemptions
8
into the FTCA beyond those provided by Congress.
Thus, by its decision in Muniz, the Court indicated its determination to
maintain an expansive interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Through
1963, the Supreme Court had considered the substantive construction of the
FTCA eight times in seventeen years, and six of those times had adopted a
liberal view of the Act. The two cases in which the Court took a more narrow
view, Feres and Dalehite,had been selectively limited and distinguished by
the later cases so that their precedential value beyond situations of analogous
fact patterns was suspect.8 9
81 Most lower courts that had considered the issue had denied prisoners' tort claims. James v.
United States, 280 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 845 (1960); Lack v. United States, 262
F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958); Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957); Sigmon v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
82 In its determination of congressional intent, the Court found the following factors
significant: the "plain import of the statutory language," the number of prisoners' claims among
the applications for private bills prior to passage of the FTCA and the frequent mention of, but
inaction upon, a prisoner-claims exception in the passage of the FTCA. 374 U.S. at 153-58.
83 374 U.S. at 159.
84 Id. at 160. Only federal prisoners working in Federal Prison Industries were covered by any
prison compensation scheme (about 18%of all prisoners). Woody, Recovery by FederalPrisoners
Under the FederalTort Claims Act, 36 WASH. L. REV. 338,351 (1961). The Muniz plaintiffs were
not covered, and this was noted by the Court.
85 374 U.S. at 162.
s1 Id. at 165.
87 Id. at 166.
88 Id. at 153.
88 Professor Jacoby had cause to state that "[i]t is now generally recognized that Feres is a
well-established but limited doctrine excluding from coverage under the Tort Claims Act
military plaintiffs, broadly subject to military discipline who seek recovery for wrongs sustained
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IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION THROUGH

Muniz

In reviewing the Supreme Court decisions after Dalehite and through
Muniz, certain characteristics and patterns emerge. It seems clear that the
basis for interpreting the FTCA broadly rested on the Court's general distaste
for the unfairness wrought by the concept of sovereign immunity.
Throughout the majority opinions in these cases are statements reflecting the
Court's recognition of the hardships falling on individuals barred from
judicial relief by governmental immunity. The concern for the welfare of the
individual that dominated the legal thinking of the Court during this period
was naturally reflected through the Supreme Court's adoption of a "literal"
reading of the FTCA, with a strict literal reading of the statutory exceptions so
as to confine exceptions to those specifically enumerated by Congress. The
refusal after Feres to imply judicial exceptions to the FTCA which would
have further restricted those claimants entitled to relief, is of course consistent
with this view.
Given this interpretation, the United States attorneys faced the difficult
task of persuading the Court that despite statutory language to the contrary,
and in the face of possible inequitable results to claimants, the Court should
nevertheless find that Congress intended to retain governmental immunity in
situations not covered by the statutory exceptions. The Court was not
generally well-disposed to these arguments.
However, there was one area in which it appeared that perhaps the Court
would be willing to find that recovery was not to be countenanced, and that
encompassed those cases where the claimant had a remedy alternative to the
FTCA in the form of some sort of statutory compensation scheme. On the one
hand, this would appear to be a proper inquiry since one of the purposes of the
FTCA, to extend a remedy to those who were without, is in theory
accomplished by an adequate and fair compensation scheme. On the other
hand, Congress did not make general exception for those covered by any
federal compensation statute, and thus arguably did not intend to make, as it
did for employees covered by the Federal Employee's Compensation Act
(FECA),90 such compensatory schemes the exclusive remedies for would-be
claimants. The Court had embraced both views. 91
'incident to service.' "Jacoby, supra note 50 at 1287. See, e.g., Knoch v. United States, 316 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1963).
Many legal scholars had concluded that Dalehite, although never expressly overruled, no
longer was the prevailing view. Hink and Schutter, Some Thoughts on the American Law of
Government Tort Liability, 20 RuT. L. REV. 710,723 (1966); Peck, supra note 30. See also articles
cited supra note 79. And see Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797,808 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Stewart).
'0Federal Employees Compensation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §8116 (current version
at 5 U.S.C. § 8116 (1976)). FECA was amended after the Court's decision in Brooks v. United
States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), to make it the exclusive remedy for federal employees who are injured
while acting within the scope of their employment.
" In Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), the Court found the existence of veteran
benefits no bar to the application of the FTCA, although since the Court saw "no indication that
Congress meant the United States to pay twice for the same injury," it required a set-off of the
benefits from any FTCA judgment. Id. at 53. Accord United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113
(1954) (set-off of veteran disability benefits), and United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 160
(dicta, that the existence of a compensation statute "does not of necessity" preclude a suit for
negligence). But see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135. 144 (1950). See notes 43-97 and
accompanying text.
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The question appears to have been settled three years after Muniz in

United States v. Demko. 92 There, the Supreme Court held that federal
prisoners who received disability payments for injuries sustained while
performing assigned tasks in the Federal Prison Industries program 93 were
precluded from recovering under the FTCA. The Court viewed the statute as
analogous to workmen's compensation laws, which the Court had previously
recognized as substitutes for common-law tort actions94 and found the prison
compensation statute to be an adequate substitute for FTCA relief. Muniz
was distinguished as not involving prisoners protected by the prison
compensation law. 95
The Supreme Court's decision in Demko established that when a claimant
had another adequate statutory remedy against the United States, the
availability of such compensation would be considered persuasive evidence
that the FTCA was not intended to apply to give the plaintiff a double
recovery. However, the absence of such a remedy would still remain a
significant burden for the government to overcome in showing that Congress
intended to disallow recovery in the absence of the application of one of the
statutory exceptions.
As mentioned above, the broad interpretation of the FTCA by the Court
was well-founded in the dual purposes of the Act, to extend a remedy to those
who had been without, and to greatly relieve Congress of the burden of
considering private petitions for relief. 96 The Court further had found support
for its broad view in the fact that Congress was free to amend the FTCA if it
97
felt Court interpretations were going too far.
In sum, the evolution throughout these years of the FTCA was towards an
92385 U.S. 149 (1966).

91 18 U.S.C. § 4121 et seq. (1976). The prisoner had been compensated pursuant to the
provision that requires the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a federal corporation, to use its funds
"to compensate inmates or their dependants for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work
activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined." 18
U.S.C. § 4126 (1976).
"' See Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 472 (1952).
" Thus, for the first time since Feres,the Supreme Court "implied" an exception to the FTCA.
The Court appeared to completely reject the dicta in Muniz, with the dissenters failing even to
argue for the intermediate position (requiring a set-off) taken by the Brooks Court. (The main
thrust of the dissent by Justice White was on a question of fact, whether or not the prison
compensation statute was an adequate substitute for a FTCA remedy.) However the Demko
decision did not represent a dramatic return to a narrow view of the FTCA. The composition of
the Court that decided Demko was identical to that of the Muniz Court, save for the appointment
of Justice Fortas, who succeeded to the position left vacant by the departure of Justice
Goldberg. The decision did not actually overrule any prior decisions, and was unaccompanied by
any language to indicate a shift in the manner of interpretation of the FTCA. The Court appeared
merely to have espoused the narrow rationale that a claimant could not have two bites of the
government apple. The main purposes of the FTCA were still met since the claimant was not left
without a remedy. Demko is significant in that it firmly established that recovery under the FTCA
is only permissible in the absence of an adequate statutory compensation substitute, since the
presence of such a scheme is considered persuasive evidence of congressional intent that the
compensation scheme is to be the exclusive remedy for would-be claimants.
91In Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957), the Court noted that, absent the
FTCA, the claimant would have been left without a remedy: "[Wlhen the entire burden falls on
the injured party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and
apparently did, decide that this would be unfair.
See also Unit6d States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
340 U.S. 543, 551-52 (1951).
'7 Compare the approach of the Court in Feres, where the Court denied the liability of the
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expansive view of the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity. Underlying this interpretation was the view of the majority of the Court that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was inequitable. Since Congress intended
to alleviate that inequity by enacting the FTCA, the Court was unwilling to
limit the Act's effectiveness by either a narrow view of the waiver of immunity
or an expansive view of the exceptions.
V.

RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Except for Demko, it was not until almost ten years after the Muniz
decision that the Supreme Court had occasion to make a major interpretation
of the FTCA. Considerable changes had taken place in the composition of the
Supreme Court during those years,9 and the Burger Court had not
theretofore spoken on the FTCA. The opportunity presented itself in Lairdv.
Nelms. 9 In granting certiorari, 100 the Court indicated its desire to finally
resolve the issue of whether the United States would be strictly liable for its
harmful activities in those states where private individuals would be liable.
The claimant in Nelms sought recovery for damages to his home allegedly
resulting from a sonic boom caused by a military aircraft flying over North
Carolina on a training mission. The Fourth Circuit 10 ' had reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, and had followed its
decision in United States v. Praylou,10 2 which had permitted a recovery by the
plaintiff and had distinguished the Supreme Court's discussion of the strict
liability issue in Dalehite.
The Supreme Court overturned the decision by the Fourth Circuit, and
held that strict liability would not lie against the United States under the
FTCA. In essence, the majority revived the Dalehiteopinion to the extent that
Dalehite construed the FTCA to preclude the possibility of governmental
liability absent any proof of a "negligent or wrongful act or omission." Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, asserted that the discussion in Dalehite
on the strict liability issue had been the holding of the case. He reasoned that
Dalehite required the conclusion that the FTCA imposes a "uniform federal
limitation on the types of acts committed by its employees for which the
United States has consented to be sued."'1 3 Since under this view state law was
then irrelevant to any consideration of whether an act was tortious, Justice
Rehnquist turned to the terms of the statute itself. The opinion went on to
reaffirm Dalehite's construction of "wrongful" as involving blameworthy
Government and contented itself with the knowledge that "if we misinterpret the Act, at least
Congress possesses a ready remedy." 340 U.S. at 138; with the opposite approach in Rayonier and
Muniz, where the Court allowed liability, stating that "[i]f the Act is to be altered that is a function
for the same body that adopted it." Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. at 320 (quoted in
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 166 (1963)).
'8 Only Justices Douglas and White remained from the Court that decided Muniz, and only
Justice Douglas was on the bench during the major evolution in the interpretation of the FTCA.
19406 U.S. 797 (1972), noted in 6 AKRON L. REV. 105 (1973); 22 J.PuB. L. 219 (1973); 48 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 727 (1973); 40 TENN. L. REV. 767 (1973); 47 TUL. L. REV. 920 (1973); and 25 U. FLA.L.
REV. 408 (1973).
1 404 U.S. 1037 (1972).
101
Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971), noted in 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136 (1972).
112208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954). See note 77 supra.
101
406 U.S. at 799.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1978

15

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:267

conduct, thus barring any imposition of strict liability. After examining the

legislative history, the majority concluded that Congress intended to exclude
liability based solely on the ultrahazardous nature of the governmental

activity

104

Justice Stewart, in a strong dissent, castigated the majority for ignoring the
post-Dalehite decisions that had "implicitly abandoned" the holding in
Dalehite that the FTCA did not permit suits in strict liability.1 0 5 He criticized
the majority's interpretation of the legislative history,1 0 6 and questioned the
policy behind a decision that would result in employees of the United States
not being liable for damages caused by such ultra-hazardous activities as
blasting, while private
individuals would find themselves liable regardless of
10 7
their precautions.
The Nelms decision resulted in a tremendous outpouring of commentary
critical of the decision.108 Criticism was focused on the Court's reading of the
legislative history of the FTCA; 10 9 the finding that the true holding of Dalehite,
which appeared to clearly have been grounded upon an interpretation of the
discretionary function exception, was instead grounded upon a denial of strict
liability;1 10 the corresponding failure of the Court to decide Nelms on the
discretionary function exception and to give guidance to its effect;"' the
failure of the majority to examine the Dalehite analysis of strict liability in the
perspective of later Supreme Court cases which appeared to overrule, or at
least limit its effect;'1 and finally, the failure of the Court to be faithful
to its
3
previous interpretations of the policy underpinning the FTCA.1
This last point is especially worthy of note. The strict liability in tort
104 Id.

at 801.
at 808.
106 Id. at 805-06, nn. 3 & 4.
105 Id.

1'Id. at 809.
10sSee articles cited supranote 99. See also 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §25.08.12 (Supp. 1976); Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for Review and Revision of the FederalTort
ClaimsAct, 48 WASH. L. REV. 291 (1973); and Reynolds, Strict Liability Under the FederalTorts
Claims Act: Does "Wrongfu" Cover a Few Sins, No Sins or Non-Sins?, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 813
(1974).
101
Most commentators have concluded that there is nothing in the legislative history which
precludes absolute liability. See Reynolds, supra note 108, at 817-18; Comment, Absolute
Liability Under the Federal Tort ClaimsAct, 60 MIL. L. REV. 53,61 (1973); 6 AKRON L. REV. 105,
108 (1973); 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1973). The Court's view of the legislative history
necessarily conflicts with that part of the act which provides that the United States shall be
liable in situations where a private person "would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1976). As discussed, this
language was interpreted in both Indian Towing and Rayonier to mean that wherever a private
individual would be liable under the law of the jurisdiction of the tort, so would the United States,
and rejected the distinction between governmental and proprietary activities as far as the liability
of the United States was concerned. The Nelms rationale necessarily implied that state law is not
to be the measure of liability of the United States in all cases.
1j0
3 K. DAVIS, supra note 108; Peck, supra note 108, at 397-98.
lMIClark, Discretionary Function and Official Immunity: judicial Forays into Sanctuaries
from Tort Liability, 16 A.F. L. REV. 33, 38 (1974).
112 Many of the commentators have agreed with Justice Stewart, who, in his dissent, referring
to the later decisions in Indian Towing and Rayonier stated that "[tihese developments, together
with an approving citation of the Praylou case in Rayonier . . .have until today been generally
understood to mean that the language in Dalehite rejecting the absolute-liability doctrine had
been implicitly abandoned." 406 U.S. at 808. See also Peck, supra note 108 at 396-97; 6 AKRON L.
REV. 105, 107-08 (1973); 60 MIL. L. REV. 53, 60-62 (1973).
113 Reynolds, supra note 108, at 833-35. See also Peck, supra note 108, at 411-12.
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doctrine and the passage of the FTCA share similar underlying policy
considerations: the belief that an innocent individual injured by another's
activity should not be forced to shoulder the entire loss, and the idea that those
enterprises (or governments) that undertake activities resulting in harm to
others are better able to absorb and spread the cost of damage than any
individual.1 4 This philosophy was expressly recognized by the Supreme
Court in Indian Towing. 1 5 Failure to give it recognition in Nelms marked a
departure from the Court's tradition of giving the FTCA a broad interpretation.
In Nelms, the majority abandoned the philosophy of Brown, Indian
Towing, Rayonier and Muniz, that there was no justification for the Court to
read exceptions into the FTCA beyond those provided by Congress; in fact
none of those decisions were even cited in the majority opinion. The Nelms
result is that, contrary to express words of Congress requiring that the United
States be liable under state law in the same capacity as a private citizen, there
are situations in which the United States nonetheless will not be liable. The
Court failed to properly consider the dual purposes of the Act with the effect
that future claimants under strict liability theories would be left without any
remedy for injury short of a petition to Congress for relief." 6 Rather than avail
itself of an opportunity to further limit the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
the Court instead chose to revitalize a barrier to recovery.
The Supreme Court next considered the boundaries of the FTCA in Logue
v. United States, 1 7 although in a quite different context from that of Nelms.
Logue involved the case of a federal prisoner who was arrested for-allegedly
conspiring to smuggle marijuana into Texas from Mexico. Logue was
incarcerated in the Nueces County Jail, Corpus Christi, Texas, which was
being used as a "contract jail" by the United States."'" The following day
Logue attempted suicide. He was removed to a hospital where a psychiatrist
examined him and declared him to be psychotic, with suicidal tendencies, and
recommended that he be transferred to another hospital equipped to treat his
suicidal tendencies. The Deputy United States Marshall decided instead to
return him to the county jail, and did so, advising the county jailers that Logue
should be placed in a special cell barren of items with which he could injure
himself. No arrangements were made to keep Logue under constant
surveillance, and the next day Logue hanged himself with his arm bandage.
Logue's parents brought suit under the FTCA claiming negligence on the part
of the jailers and the Deputy Marshall. The pertinent issue was whether, for
"I Reynolds,

supra note 108, at 834.

115Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).

116However, enterprising counsel in federal courts have persuasively utilized tort doctrines of
liability other than absolute liability in order to prevent the harshness of the result as incurred in
Nelms. See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952) (res ipsa loquitur); United States
v. Gaidys, 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952) (trespass); Adams v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 254 F.
Supp. 78 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (trespass); Grant v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Okla. 1970)
(taking of property for public use). See, 60 MIL. L. REV. 53,66-71 (1973); 40 TENN. L. REV. 767,776
(1973). But these remedies are exceptional extensions of traditional tort doctrines and result in "an
unequal and unpredictable application of the law that is bound to result in confusion and
contempt for the judicial process." 60 MIL. L. REV. 53, 66 (1973).
117 412 U.S. 521 (1973).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1976), gives authority to the Federal Bureau of Prisons to contract with
state prisons for the housing of federal prisoners.
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purposes of the FTCA, the county jailers were "employees" of the United
States, in which case the United States would be liable, or merely employees
of an independent contractor (the county jail), a status for which Congress
had specifically rejected liability on the part of the United States.11 9 The Fifth
Circuit 12 0 had reversed the district court's judgment that the United States was
liable for the acts of the jailers, on the ground that the jail was an independent
contractor, and any negligence on the part of its employees was not the
negligence of the United States.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit. 121 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist interpreted the
language of the FTCA to adopt the "traditional distinction between
employees of the principal and employees of an independent contractor with
the principal,' 122 and indicated that the critical factor in determining if an
individual can be considered an employee of the principal is whether or not
the principal had the authority and power to control the physical performance
of the independent contractor.12 3 After examining the legislation that
authorized the Bureau of Prisons to contract with state and local prisons, the
Court concluded that Congress contemplated that operations of the
contractor's facilities were to be within the control of the contractor.124 Under
the specific contract entered into with the Nueces County Jail, the United
States had no authority to physically supervise the conduct of the jail's
that the individuals were not
employees, and thus the majority concluded
25
employees of the federal government.
The Court then addressed the question of whether or not the jail
employees were "acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity,"
since under the terms of the statute such individuals are to be considered
"employees" of the United States,' 2 6 and concluded that if these jailers were to
fit within that appellation, the doors to governmental liability would be
opened for the negligent acts of all employees of independent contractors,

"9 The United States is liable under the FTCA for money damages "caused by the negligent
"28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1976).
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976) contains the following definition:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term "Federal
agency" includes the executive departments, the military departments, independent
establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the
United States.

"Employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal agency,
members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the
service of the United States, whether with or without compensation.
120 459 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1972), rehearingdenied, 463 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1972).
121412 U.S. 521 (1973). The case was vacated for a determination of the negligence of the
Deputy Marshall. Justices Stewart and Marshall concurred in the judgment.
122412 U.S. at 527.
123 Id. at 527-28.
124 412 U.S. at 529.
12n Id. at 530.
126 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss2/9

18

1978]

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

since independent contractors usually
perform tasks that would otherwise be
12 7
performed by federal employees.
Logue can be criticized on several counts. Although the Court's decision to

apply the "right of control" test, long used by the federal courts to determine
whether a principal should be liable for the acts of another's employee, 128 was

well-founded, the application of that doctrine in Logue was too mechanical.
The Court found that the congressional legislation authorizing contract jails
contemplated that the jails, not the government, were responsible for the
control of federal prisoners, finding support for this view in the actual contract
with the jail which gave the United States no authority to physically supervise
the conduct of the jail's employees. 129 The Court thus considered the
contractual status of the parties as determinative of the issue, without
examining the actual degree of control imposed. However, it is likely that the
contract jail would have complied with any federal requests regarding
contract prisoners, and at the least, the jailers were not free of the control and

influence of the United States Marshall. 130 In light of the broad manner in
which the FTCA had been construed, and the intent of Congress to give it a
sweeping reach, it would seem inappropriate for the Court to end the inquiry
as to liability upon determination of the status of the parties, without
examining whether or not the United States was actually exerting control over
3
the employees of the jail.' '
The Supreme Court itself, in a different context, had stated in Reid v.
at 531-32.
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1958).
129412 U.S. at 530.
130 The D.C. Court of Appeals had held in Close v. United States 397 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir.
1968), in a situation analogous to Logue, that the United States was liable for an injury suffered by
a federal prisoner committed in the District of Columbia jail (a non-federal facility). The court
emphasized:
Since Congress has clearly committed the custody and safe-keeping of federal prisoners
upon conviction to the Attorney General, then it must be true that, in this instance the
D.C. jailer was serving as the Attorney General's jailer . . . it does not appear to the
contrary in the record before us, that as to this federal prisoner, the Attorney General
had some degree of power, commensurate with his continuing responsibility to
supervise the D.C. jailer in his handling of this particular prisoner.
397 F.2d at 687. The Logue Court distinguished Close as not involving a contract jail. 412
U.S. at 532 n.8. In Witt v. United States, 462 F.2d 1261 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit
determined that a civilian employee supervising military prisoners was "amenable to some
degree of control" by the Commandant of the Disciplinary Barracks and was thus "acting on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily . . .in the service of the United
States . . . without compensation." Id. at 1264. The Second Circuit expressly noted the intent of
Congress was to give the FTCA "an expansive reach." Id. at 1263. The Witt case was dismissed by
Justice Rehnquist as being contrary to the court of appeals determination in Logue. 412 U.S. at
532 n.8.
131 For a recent opinion in which a court refuses to allow the contractual status of the parties to
be determinative per se, see Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1977). The case
involved a collision of a mail truck with claimant's car. The court stated, in reference to a contract
offered by the United States in support of a motion for summary judgment to show that a mail
truck was in the service of an independent contractor, that: "[tihe crucial issue is whether the
Postal Service exercised such control over the mail truck and its driver despite the contract, that
the driver was actually an employee of the federal government within the meaning of the Federal
Tort Claims Act rather than an employee of an independent contractor . . . [ilt
cannot be said at
this state of proceeding that there is no other evidence." 552 F.2d at 563 (emphasis added).
127Id.

128 See,
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Covert132 that "[i]t has long been settled that an officer, while holding
prisoners for the United States, is the'keeper of the United States' . . . and,
as such, is an officer of the United States 33. . . .Whether the Government
should maintain its own jail in the District of Columbia, or utilize local
facilities, is simply a matter of administrative convenience .... .134 TheCourt concluded that "[f]or all practical purposes, the District of Columbia
jail . . .is the 'jail of the United States' . . . and the Superintendent its
keeper . . . [and] an employee of the United States .....
135
Finally, the Court in Logue expressed the belief that if it was to find that
the county jailers were "employees" of the United States in the sense that they
had "acted on behalf of a federal agency," the United States would be
subjected to liability for almost all the negligent actions of its independent
contractors. 36 That need not follow, however. For one thing, the actual
language of the Act defines employees as including those who have "acted on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity" (emphasis added). 3 The
Court's opinion effectively ignores the "in an official capacity" qualification. The "official capacity" language 13 would seem to indicate that the
United States would have to hold out to third parties that a particular contractor was empowered to act for it before liability would attach, a situation
that did indeed exist in Logue but probably does not for the vast majority of
independent contractors employed by the United States. It also can be argued
that the United States has a special responsibility for the care and safety of
federal prisoners, and should bear the ultimate responsibility when those in
its charge are negligently injured. 39 In this way, governmental liability would
still not lie against the United States should a member of the public be injured by an independent contractor's employee working on behalf of the
government.
The Supreme Court again rejected a broad construction of "employee" for
FTCA purposes three years later in the case of United States v. Orleans.'40 A
351 U.S. 487 (1956). The case arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976), which provided that:
Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment,
decree, or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress
unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any
of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party.
The question was whether or not the Superintendent of the District of Columbia jail was an
"employee."
133 351 U.S. at 489-90.
134 Id. at 490.
'35
Id. But see Randolph v. Donaldson, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 76 (1815), (holding a U.S. Marshal,
who had entrusted a federal prisoner to a state jailer, not liable for the acts of the jailer in allowing
the prisoner to escape). The situation in Reid was different from Logue in that in Reid the
Superintendent of the District of Columbia jail was required by Congress to "receive and keep"
federal prisoners. However, the United States still had no power to control the Superintendent's
day-to-day activities, yet the Reid Court nevertheless found him to be an employee of the
government "for all practical purposes." Id.
136412 U.S. at 532.
137 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
I'sAs the Logue Court noted, the legislative history "sheds virtually no light" on the
congressional intent in enacting the "acting on behalf of" language. 412 U.S. at 530.
'3' This point was made in the dissent from denial of rehearing in the court of appeals. 463
F.2d 1340, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1972).
140 425 U.S. 807 (1977).
132
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local community-action agency, the Warren-Trumbull Council for Economic
Opportunity, Inc. (WTCEO), established pursuant to Title II of the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964141 and entirely funded by the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO), had, through one of its "centers" scheduled a
recreational outing. A van was furnished by the center, but since it was not
large enough to transport all of the children interested in going, the WTCEO
arranged for two men to drive the children to the outing in privately owned
automobiles. The claimant was the father of one of the children injured when
one of the cars struck a parked truck. The district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the WTCEO
was not an agency of the United States. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
unanimously reversed. 42 The court of appeals read the FTCA in conjunction
with the OEO, and concluded that since both were intended to remedy
hardship, Congress could not have intended that those who sustain injury in
the course of federally initiated, approved and funded programs be
precluded from recovery under the FTCA. In an opinion by Chief Justice
143
Burger, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals.
The Chief Justice began his analysis by observing that "the Federal Tort
Claims Act is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity . . . ,"'44 and stated
that "[s] ince the United States can be sued only to the extent that it has waived
its immunity, due regard must be given to the exceptions ....
145 The Court
relied on its decision in Logue to assert that the critical question in the case was
whether or not WTCEO's day-to-day operations were supervised by the
federal government. The Court concluded that it was "inconceivable" that
Congress intended to waive its sovereign immunity in a case such as that
presented by Orleans, since if federal funding was the standard upon which
the government assumed the liability of entities carrying on its purposes, the
United States would be liable to "countless unidentifiable classes of
'beneficiaries' " for activities over which it usually had no control. 146 Support
for this conclusion was found in the legislative history, which indicated that
Congress had contemplated the strengthening of community capabilities in
the fight against poverty and the fact that the Economic Opportunity Act
provided that a community action agency was to be administered by a
community action board composed of local officials and representatives of
other community groups.
The opinion made no mention of the issue of whether, if the WTCEO was
not a federal agency, its employees nevertheless were "acting on behalf of a
federal agency [the OEO] in an official capacity." The Court appeared to
conclude without discussion that a finding that an agency was not a federal
agency precluded a finding that the agency's employees could be
"employees" of the government for purposes of the FTCA, regardless of the
147
circumstances.
4142 U.S.C. §§ 2781-2837 (1976).
142509 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1975).
143425 U.S. 807 (1977).

144Id. at 813.
141 Id.

at 814. The Court cited Dalehite for this statement.

146Id. at 816.
147Id.
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The problem with the Orleans decision is not necessarily the denial of
liability on the part of the United States. It would have been a monumental
decision for the Court to have held that local agencies funded and
programmed by the United States were federal agencies within the purview
of the FTCA, with the government being liable for acts of employees over
which the government had no control. And as the Court pointed out, the
economic and other consequences of such liability could have been
staggering.1 4 What was significant about Orleans was the Supreme Court's
articulation of the view that the FTCA was a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity. A protective attitude toward governmental liability was clear
throughout the opinion. Additionally, the Court was certain that Congress had
not intended the result of the court of appeals decision. But in light of the fact
that this type of federal funding, with federal control, programming, and
channeling of funds, is a relatively new phenomenon and likely not to have
been contemplated during the passage of the FTCA, it would seem that the
confidence the Court had in its view of the congressional intent was
misplaced. Doubtless the spectre of the United States' greatly expanded
liability was a significant factor in guiding the Court toward its decision.
In its most recent pronouncement on the FTCA, the Supreme Court
addressed itself to an issue that had been disputed by the lower courts ever
since its Feres decision: the issue of whether a private party defendant could
implead the United States in a suit where a plaintiff/serviceman was barred
from seeking recovery directly against the government because of the Feres
doctrine; that is, whether the United States' immunity from liability to its
servicemen in the line of duty also bars claims of third parties who, when sued
by a serviceman, seek indemnification from the United States.149 In Stencel
Aero EngineeringCorp. v. United States,50 the Supreme Court, relying on the
rationale of its decision in Feres, held that third-party liability would not lie
against the United States in an action where the United States would not be
liable to the original claimant.
In Stencel, Captain Donham, an Air Force Reserve pilot assigned for
training to the Missouri National Guard,15 1was injured by a malfunction in his
"life-support" system when he ejected from his aircraft in an emergency
situation. Donham sued both the Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation
(Stencel), which had manufactured the system, and the United States. Stencel
denied liability and cross-claimed against the United States since it had
designed the system to government specifications and the system was in the
possession and under the control of the Air Force. Stencel's contention was

""Id. at 815-16.
M4Compare Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), and United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub noma., United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), with Barry v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), and Wellington Transp. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 108 (6th Cir.
1973).
150431 U.S. 666 (1977).
151 It is generally accepted that members of the air national guard are members of the United
States military, and the Feres doctrine has been uniformly applied against them. See Layne v.
United States, 295 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962); Peluso v. United
States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
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that if it was negligent, it was only passively negligent, while the United States

was actively negligent and should be forced to indemnify Stencel.5 2 The
district court dismissed the United States as a party, on the basis of Feres,and
also dismissed Stencel's cross-claim for indemnity upon the same ground. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed.'-

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in a 7-2 decision, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Burger. 54 The majority conceived of the issue as a
tug-of-war between the Yellow Cab doctrine that the FTCA had waived the
government's immunity in sweeping
language and the "equally well55
established doctrine" of Feres.1
In reaching its decision, the Court relied solely on its decision in Feres,
ignoring several of its own cases decided in other contexts156 that arguably had
held that third-party indemnification did lie against the United States when
the original claimant was statutorily barred from proceeding against the
government. Instead, the majority merely reviewed the factors of the Feres
decision found determinative by the court of appeals, and found them
conclusive. The first was the fact that the relationship between the
government and its suppliers of ordnance, like that of the relationship
between the government and its military, is "distinctively federal in
character.' ' 5 1 Such a finding, the Court felt, justified a finding of inapplicability of state tort law to the case. The majority found that the reasons for not

allowing servicemen to be subject to state law were applicable to government
contractors when an identical injury to the serviceman was involved. Second,
the majority found that, even though the claimant had no remedy at all if it

could not recover under the FTCA, unlike the claimant in Feres, Congress
intended the military compensation scheme to be the "upper limit of liability
for the Government as to service-connected injuries."'' 58 Third, a factor not

made explicit in Feres, but explicated in Brown - the deleterious effects of
suits by servicemen against their officers on military discipline - was found to
be significant. The Court felt that military discipline would be impaired, since
152 For the theory of indemnification in tort, see generally Davis, Indemnity Between
Negligent Tortfeasors;A ProposedRationale,37 IA. L. REV. 517 (1951); Leflar, Contributionand
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
l- Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976).
154431 U.S. 666 (1977).
1,55Id. at 670. It is noteworthy that the majority did not grant that the FTCA had waived
immunity in sweeping language, but rather noted that "Petitionerarguesthat '[t]he Federal Tort
Claims Act waives the Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language.' United States v.
Yellow Cab." (emphasis added). Id.
-6 The Supreme Court has ruled on three cases having a bearing on this issue: Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); Weyerhauser Steamship
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963); and Treadwell Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 772
(1963). For a discussion of these cases and the issue generally when the third-party plaintiff seeks
indemnification from the government and the injured party is covered by the Federal Employees
Compensation Act, see Note, Contribution and Indemnity Under the Federal Employees'
CompensationAct, 6 TOL. L. REV. 273 (1974). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R. FED. 616 (1972). Several
commentators have concluded that the Supreme Court cases noted above support the
proposition that indemnity should be allowed in the type of situation presented in the Stencel
case. Jacoby, supra note 50, at 1289-93; 25 KAN. L. REV. 601, 605-07 (1977).
157431 U.S. at 672. For a discussion of this language, see note 160, infra.

-1 Id.at 673.
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any trial on the indemnification issue would essentially require examination of
the same issues of fact as a suit against the military, would involve "second
guessing military orders, and would often require members of the armed
services to testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions." '5 9
The determination of the Supreme Court to construe the FTCA very
narrowly was exemplified clearly in Stencel, yet the reasoning and the result
are indefensible. The Stencel majority made no mention or discussion of the
history or purpose of the FTCA, which seems unwarranted in light of the
failure of Congress to specifically address the problem in the FTCA itself. The
majority appeared to feel that the Feres decision was completely dispositive
of the issue in the case. This view completely failed to take into account the
limits the Supreme Court had placed on the Feres decision in Brown and
Muniz. Those cases were not even cited by the majority, or their rationales
discussed or distinguished.
The resurrection of the "distinctively federal" language is unfortunate;1 60
after Feresthat phrase was never used again by the Court in an FTCA context.
To conclude that the FTCA is not applicable because of the existence of such
a "federal relationship" is to revive, through different rhetoric, the old
"governmental/non-governmental" distinctions that had been struck down in
Rayonier and Indian Towing. Suppliers of ordnance differ from other
governmental suppliers only in that they usually have no other buyers for their
products; only the federal government purchases from them. By concentrating upon the relationship of the parties, the Court has laid the groundwork
for future anomalous results. For example, if an Army truck negligently
collides with an ordnance supplier's truck while the latter is delivering parts to
an Army base pursuant to a government contract, could Congress really be
thought to intend federal common law to apply in such a situation on the
grounds that the relationship between the supplier and the government is
"distinctively federal in character"?6 1 The "distinctively federal" phrase is

159 Id.
160 The "distinctively federal in character" language has its origin in United States v. Standard

Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), in which the Court had concluded that the relationship between a
serviceman and the government was "fundamentally derived from federal sources" and should
be governed by federal authority. Id. at 305-06. The case arose in the context of an indemnity
action by the United States where the government sought to receive indemnification from
Standard Oil for medical expenses paid by it to a soldier injured when struck by one of the
company's trucks. The Court refused to allow the indemnification, concluding that only Congress
had the power to create liability in favor of the government in the form of indemnification; since
Congress had failed to act, it was presumed to acquiese with the resulting "interference with
federal funds." Id. at 315-16.
Standard Oil was decided prior to the effective date of the FTCA. By enacting the FTCA,
Congress provided the statutory rule of decision that the Court felt was lacking in Standard Oil.
The extent of the government's liability was to be determined pursuant to state law, under the
same standards that a private individual would be liable. Thus, Standard Oil is a poor case to
support any FTCA decision. And even if StandardOil were otherwise applicable, the decision in
Stencel is not consistent with it because the implication in StandardOil was that, should Congress
act, the courts would be obliged to respect the resulting rule of liability. In Stencel, after Congress
had acted through the FTCA, the Court nevertheless concluded that a federal, not state, rule of
decision should be applied.
16' Petitioner's Brief at 33, Stencil Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977)
suggests such a situation.
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contrary to the express language of the Act requiring that the United States be
liable according to "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
It is hard to see, as the dissent pointed out, where the boundaries of the
"distinctively federal" principle end; 62 the result will doubtless be to include
an ever-increasing number of activities performed by the United States,
insulating those activities from liability.
In addition, the reason upon which the Court rested its determination in
Feres that state law was inapplicable - the unfairness in having the serviceman's action depend on the vagaries of state law - had no counterpart in
Stencel. Manufacturing companies are accustomed to having claims against
them depend on the laws of the states into which their products flow. There
was no claim of unfairness to Stencel, nor could one be justified.
The Court's finding that third-party actions such as presented in Stencel
were threats to military discipline also is not well-founded. As the dissent
pointed out, the concern in Feres, as further articulated in Brown, with "[t]he
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors," is not present
when a non-military third party brings suit. 63 The dissent noted that if the
injured claimant had been a civilian, had sued the manufacturer and the
manufacturer had sought indemnification from the government, there would
be no doubt that such an action against the government would lie. Such an
action could also involve "second-guessing military orders," and would
require members of the armed services to testify in court as to each other's
decisions, but would be a perfectly permissible action. 64 The Court's concern
for the "second-guessing" of military orders in future litigation would seem
groundless in light of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA,
which, although not applicable in Stencel, would protect the military from the
effects of its policy decisions and preclude liability whenever a claim
stemmed from activity caused by orders of superior officers. The Court's
evident failure to consider this no doubt caused it to be more concerned about
the effect on military discipline than was warranted.
One of the principles underlying prior FTCA decisions of the Supreme
Court was that Congress must have tacitly intended to exclude recovery
whenever a claimant was covered by a simple and uniform compensation
scheme, and conversely, when no such scheme was provided, there was a
presumption toward finding liability on the part of the United States.16 5 In
Stencel, the Supreme Court ignored this principle of construction. The result
there, which saddles the manufacturer with the whole liability, is also contrary
to one of the purposes which impelled Congress to enact the FTCA - to
remove the burden of private bills of relief from Congress. Since the company
had no further remedy or source of compensation available to it, its only
recourse would be to seek relief directly from Congress. This consideration

162431 U.S. at 677 (Marshal, J. dissenting).
U.S. at 676 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
164Id. at 676-77.
163 431

'16

See text accompanying notes 43-97 supra.
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had been persuasive before, in Yellow Cab,16 and was nonetheless so in
Stencel.
The majority's decision leaves Stencel to suffer the damage incurred by the
government's negligence (assuming that it could have been proven). The
effect is to leave to third parties the responsibility and burden of fully
compensating injuries to servicemen when the government is at fault.'67
Clearly, this is contrary to the broad, enlightened principles which the
Supreme Court has enunciated in its prior decisions, and by again implying a
judicial exception to the Tort Claims Act, the Supreme Court has barred
another set of claimants from judicial relief.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the Stencel decision, the path that the Supreme Court
has taken with respect to the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act is
clear. The Court has rejected the idea that the FTCA is a sweeping waiver of
sovereign immunity, and has turned its back on the long line of cases which
had applied such a statutory construction. Instead, the Supreme Court's view,
as it stated in Orleans, is that the FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity. In so perceiving the intent of Congress to grudgingly relinquish
immunity, the Supreme Court has given new life to its earlier decisions in
Feres and Dalehite which had insulated the United States from liability.
The Supreme Court has even gone beyond the strict views of Fereswith its
decision in Stencel, since the effect is to leave the claimants completely
without any remedy, short of a petition to Congress. The Court will refuse to
indulge in the presumption, adopted in its earlier decisions, that absent a
specific exception of the FTCA being applicable, failure of Congress to
provide a statutory remedy weighs in favor of allowing recovery in close
cases. This result is extremely unfortunate in light of the unfairness to the
claimants, and is contrary to the dual purposes of the FTCA of allowing
recovery to claimants who had been without a remedy, and avoiding the flood
of petitions for private relief by Congress.
The basic doctrinal position of the Burger Court seems to be that the
government is in need of fiscal protection from the tort claims of its citizens.
Indeed, in none of its decisions construing the FTCA has the Burger Court
allowed recovery against the United States. The Court is disregarding the
caution of Justice Frankfurter in the Indian Towing case, to the effect that
courts should not act as a "self-constituted guardian of the Treasury" in
situations where legislatures have acted to limit sovereign immunity.168 These
166340 U.S. 543 (1951). There the Court stated, vis-a-vis the effect of denying the liability of the
United States for contribution:
if the injured party recovered judgment against the private tortfeasor, it would mean
that (despite local substantive law favoring contributory liability) that an individual
could not sue the government for the latter's contributory share of the same damages.
Presumably, the claimant would be relegated to a private bill for legislative relief. Such
a result should not be read into this Act without a clearer statement of it than appears
here.
Id. at 551-52.
167 Id. at 675.
l68 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).
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decisions clearly prevent the further erosion of the sovereign immunity
doctrine, and may represent the vestiges of a "judicial state of mind
conditioned by the spectre that relinquishment [of immunity] will bankrupt
1 69
the sovereign and result in governmental paralysis."
Enough has been said previously, and in other legal commentary, to justify
the conclusion that such a view is unnecessary, inequitable and unwarranted.
Modem considerations of fairness and enterprise responsibility and risksharing, as well as applicable principles of statutory construction argue
persuasively in favor of an expansive view of governmental liability. It is
extremely regrettable that the Supreme Court has recently rejected these
principles in favor of protecting the United States from the tort claims of its
citizens. It is submitted that the government is adequately protected through
the language of the FTCA and the statutory exceptions, and that it is both
doctrinally unnecessary, and substantively inequitable, to judicially restrict
access to redress. Given the present trend and thinking of the Supreme Court,
however, the prospect of further limitation upon the activities for which the
United States will be liable in tort, and further restrictions upon those who can
recover, cannot be doubted.
RICHARD KROTSENG
'6 Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A ComparativeStudy of the Soverign
Immunity Doctrine in the United States and the New York Court of Claims, 22 AD.L. REV. 597,

614 (1970).
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